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Introduction
Since the pioneering work by Becker (1968) , law enforcement has attracted considerable attention by economists as well as other social scientists, and for good reasons. The development of e¢ cient enforcement systems is inextricably linked with economic growth, …nancial development and the rise of modern democracies. Designing 'good'laws, in fact, might not su¢ ce to guarantee these objectives without an e¤ective deterrence.
Several prominent scholars in law and economics have, over the past decades, debated intensively on the notion of optimal enforcement of law. In models where agents simply consider whether to commit a single illegal act or not, the threat of severe sanctions is enough to deter people from infringing the law: the maximum punishment principle (Becker, 1968 ). Yet, when agents can also choose the severity of the o¤ense, 'hanging people for a sheep'might not be a good idea (Friedman and Sjostrom, 1993) . Notably, undeterred individuals will have a reason to commit less, rather than more severe acts, if expected sanctions rise with severity. This tendency is sometimes said to re ‡ect marginal deterrence -i.e., the need for graduating penalties to the severity of the o¤ense. 1 Yet, the empirical literature lacks a systematic analysis of the practical relevance of marginal deterrence as opposed to competing theories of justice. In order to …ll this gap, in this paper we provide the …rst empirical assessment of marginal deterrence, by showing that this rational economic model of law enforcement provides a reasonable description of the actual policies chosen by regulators and law enforcers. First, we document a systematic positive correlation between penalties and crime severity. Second, we test the main implications of the theory underlying the logic of marginal deterrence. Third, we provide evidence on the e¤ectiveness of marginal deterrence by showing that steeper sanctions are associated with less severe crimes.
To perform the empirical analysis, we build a novel and unique data set, which combines information from multiple sources. In particular, we use individual-level data on a representative sample of inmates of US prisons from the 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities of the US Bureau of Justice Statistics. For each 1 Older theoretical contributions have assumed that each individual chooses whether or not to commit one (illegal) act -i.e., the "single-act"framework developed in Becker (1968) , Landes and Posner (1975) , Polinsky and Shavell (1984) and Friedman (1981) , among others. However, starting from the seminal contribution by Stigler (1970) , the literature has recognized the role of marginal deterrence. The logic behind this theory is fairly intuitive: stepping up enforcement against one level of the activity may induce a switch to a more severe act instead. Friedman and Sjostrom (1993) , Mookherjee and Png (1992, 1994) , Reinganum and Wilde (1986) , Shavell (1991 Shavell ( , 1992 , and Wilde (1992) study the conditions under which the presence of marginal deterrence induces optimal penalties that are graduated to the severity of the harm produced by di¤erent law infringements.
individual, the survey contains information on the crime committed, the current sentence, the criminal history and many demographic characteristics. We merge the individual-level data with three other pieces of information that are relevant to test the theory. First, we employ data on the existence and use of death penalty in each state over time to build proxies for maximum punishment. Second, we use data on police wages and on the cost of gathering weapons and ammunitions across police departments (Bove and Gavrilova, 2017; Masera, 2016) to measure monitoring costs in di¤erent states over time. Finally, we use the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual to construct an objective measure of the severity of each crime.
We start by documenting that penalties are strongly increasing in the severity of crimes. Across US states, the average slope of the punishment-severity schedule equals 0.021, indicating that an additional level of o¤ense is associated with a 2.1% increase in sentence length. The punishment-severity schedules are positively sloped in all but two states, and 75% of the positive slope coe¢ cients are also statistically signi…cant at conventional levels.
A positive relationship between punishments and crime severity is consistent with marginal deterrence, but it would obtain also when penalties are set according to alternative theories of justice such as the retributive or the incapacitation principle (see, e.g., Perry, 2006) . Retributive justice postulates that the best response to a crime should only re ‡ect the severity of the crime rather than extrinsic social purposes, such as deterrence and rehabilitation of the o¤ender (Bhuller et al., 2016) . By contrast, proponents of the incapacitation theory of punishment advocate that o¤enders should be prevented from committing further crimes either by their (temporary or permanent) removal from society or by some other method that restricts their physical ability to re-o¤end in some other way (see, e.g., Zimring and Hawkins, 1995) .
In order to clarify whether a positive correlation between penalties and crime severity can be rationalized with marginal deterrence as opposed to other theories of justice, we then move to test some comparative-statics predictions o¤ered by the general environment of marginal deterrence analyzed by Mookherjee and Png (1994) . Speci…cally, we …nd that sentences are on average longer in states where maximum punishment is higher, and shorter in states where monitoring is more costly. According to our estimates, the presence of a death penalty law in a state is associated with a 20-30% longer sentence, while a 10% increase in police wages is associated with a 3-6% drop in sentence length.
A causal interpretation of these estimates would require maximum punishment and monitoring cost to be exogenous to sentence length. The theory is largely silent on the determinants of these variables, thereby providing little guidance to search for causality.
Yet, we argue that our correlations, besides being consistent with the theory of marginal deterrence, are also remarkably strong and robust to be purely coincidental. In particular, we show that similar results obtain when controlling for state-level trends that may induce simultaneity bias, when using speci…cations with state …xed-e¤ects to absorb time-invariant heterogeneity across states, and when employing an IV strategy to get rid of shocks that may a¤ect sentence length, maximum penalty and monitoring cost simultaneously. We also …nd similar results when using alternative estimation samples and alternative proxies, including the number of capital executions to measure the actual usage of death penalty across states.
We corroborate our baseline estimates with evidence on three additional predictions of the Mookherjee and Png (1994) model. First, since the model converges to the single-act framework (Becker, 1968) if criminals are all equal, we conjecture and empirically verify that the correlations of sentence length with maximum punishment and monitoring cost are stronger in states where the private bene…ts from crime -as proxied for using income inequality data -are more heterogeneous. Second, we document that a higher maximum punishment or a lower cost of monitoring are associated with a higher monitoring rate, as proxied for at the state level using information on the employment share of policemen. Third, we show that maximum punishment and monitoring cost a¤ect sentence length not only in absolute but also in marginal terms, as the correlation between these variables is stronger for more severe crimes.
Finally, we provide evidence on the e¤ectiveness of marginal deterrence. The latter requires penalties to be graduated to crime severity, so as to avoid criminals switching to more severe acts. Accordingly, if marginal deterrence works, we should expect steeper sanctions to be associated with less severe crimes. Indeed, we …nd that in states where punishment-severity schedules are steeper, an increase in the slope of this schedule is associated with a signi…cant reduction in the average o¤ense level. Moreover, we …nd that steeper schedules are associated with relatively fewer inmates committing more serious crimes.
Our analysis is related to the literature on the determinants of crime, which has studied the role of direct policies such as the size of the police force, 2 the incarceration rate 3 and capital punishment, 4 as well as the e¤ect of more indirect factors such as abortion 5 or gun laws. 6 Unlike all these papers, we do not investigate the determinants of crime, but we rather focus on the determinants of the enforcement policies meant to …ght it. Taken together, our novel body of evidence shows that the enforcement policies and the toughness of sanctions in di¤erent US states are by and large consistent with the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement. Our results also have implications for the debate on the deterrence e¤ect of death penalty. While previous papers mainly focus on the impact that the introduction of death penalty produces on the crimes for which such an extreme form of punishment is designed -e.g., …rst degree murder -we are the …rst to document a systematic relationship between capital punishment and punishments for less severe crimes, a prediction that is consistent with marginal deterrence but not necessarily with other theories of justice. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the empirical predictions of marginal deterrence for optimal punishment. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 studies the relationships between maximum punishment, monitoring cost and sentence length. Section 5 provides additional evidence. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Background
In order to gain intuition on the empirical strategy that we will use in the next sections, we shortly summarize the basic logic of the model developed by Mookherjee and Png (1994) , which provides the most general environment to study marginal deterrence of enforcement of law. Mookherjee and Png (1994) study a model in which the level of the criminal activity is a continuous variable, and individuals derive heterogeneous bene…ts from infringing the law. In their baseline analysis, they consider an environment in which, although the monitoring system detects all acts at a common rate, regardless of their severity, acts of di¤ering severity may be penalized at di¤erent rates. The policy they consider speci…es both a monitoring rate and penalties. For given policy, each individual will choose a crime to maximize the di¤erence between the bene…ts from infringing the law -which are heterogeneous -and the expected penalty for the act -which is type independent. A consequence is that higher types -i.e., those who bene…t the most from Ehrlich (1975 Ehrlich ( , 1977 , Katz, Levitt and Shustorivich (2003) and Passell and Taylor (1977) . 5 See among others Dills and Miron (2006) , Donohue and Levitt (2001 , 2008 , Foote and Goetz (2008) , Joyce (2003 Joyce ( , 2009 ) and Lott and Whitley (2007) . 6 See Ayres and Donohue (2003a, 2003b ), Black and Nagin (1998), Helland and Tabarrok (2004) , Lott and Mustard (1997) , Lott (1998 Lott ( , 2003 and Plassmann and Whitley (2003) . a crime -cannot choose less severe acts. In the limit when all individuals derive the same bene…ts from infringing the law (no heterogeneity) the model converges to the single-act framework, where only one act is chosen in equilibrium.
In this environment the authors characterize the optimal policy for a regulator that maximizes an utilitarian welfare function, which attributes equal weight to private bene…ts, external harms and enforcement costs. The model does not allow for in…nitely large punishments, otherwise any desired pattern of deterrence could be achieved at minimal cost by combining arbitrarily low monitoring with su¢ ciently steep penalties. The monitoring rate is assumed to be non-contingent on the severity of the act produced by criminals, whereas penalties are contingent on it. 7 If enforcement were costless and the regulator could distinguish individuals'types, each individual would be induced to choose the …rst-best action, namely, the one that trades o¤ each individual's marginal bene…t against the corresponding marginal harm. This decision rule changes when enforcement becomes costly and when the regulator cannot distinguish individuals' types: the second best features a distortion that is standard in adverse selection environments à la Mirlees and re ‡ects how costly monitoring is, the heterogeneity of the pro…tability of crime across individuals as well as the maximum punishment that the society can in ‡ict to law breakers.
In a nutshell, the analysis o¤ered by Mookherjee and Png (1994) shows that -in a marginal deterrence setting -if society wishes to reduce the severity of the act chosen by a given individual, it necessarily must raise expected penalties for all more severe acts. 8 It follows that: Prediction 1. Higher punishments should be associated with more severe crimes.
Penalties, however, cannot be raised beyond the given maximum. Hence, it is not optimal to match the …rst-best degree of deterrence for any type. In this setting, an increase in 7 This is an important assumption in this and other models of marginal deterrence (see also Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Shavell, 1992; Wilde, 1992) . All these papers assume that the probabilities of apprehension (monitoring rate in Mookherjee and Png, 1994) for two or more alternative acts are determined by the same decision, so the only way of changing the expected penalty for one act without changing the expected penalty for another is by altering the actual penalty. 8 Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) investigate the question of whether the optimal punishment rises with the severity of the o¤ense. Provided that the probability of actual punishment is not decreasing in the severity of the crime -as it is typically the case in reality -our results also support the conclusions of Friedman and Sjostrom (1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1994) , who show theoretically that the expected punishment (i.e., the combination of probability and actual punishment) is increasing in the level of o¤ense. As underlined by Friedman and Sjostrom (1993) if a given crime is punished in expected terms more severely than another crime, this does not necessarily imply that the actual punishment for the …rst crime is also higher. From a theoretical point of view, some extra assumptions are required.
the maximum possible penalty increases the scope for deterrence through the means of higher penalties. The same increase in the scope for deterrence results from a fall in the monitoring cost. Intuitively, when monitoring (hence deterrence) becomes less costly, society should move closer to the …rst-best pattern of deterrence, stepping up expected penalties for all illegal acts.
Using the data described in the next section, in Section 4 we will test the following predictions:
Prediction 2. If the maximum possible punishment is higher, the regulator should, other things being equal, increase the expected penalty on all illegal acts. Prediction 3. If the cost of monitoring is higher, the regulator should, other things being equal, reduce the expected penalty on all illegal acts.
Although Predictions 2 and 3 are stated in terms of expected penalty, we will rather look at actual punishment. The reason is that, by looking at actual punishment, we can fully leverage our individual-level information on a large sample of inmates of US prisons, and control for a large set of individual-and state-level characteristics in the empirical analysis. To calculate expected penalty we must instead use more aggregated data at the state level. However, in Section 5 we show that the monitoring rate is increasing in maximum punishment and decreasing in monitoring cost. Therefore, since the monitoring rate and the actual punishment go in the right direction, the same must be true for the combination of the two -i.e., the expected punishment.
While evidence of a positive relationship between maximum punishment and expected penalties (Prediction 2) would bring support to marginal deterrence, one could argue that a similar pattern could also be generated by a punishment logic based on retribution or incapacitation. Under the presumption that a higher maximum punishment in a state testi…es to a moral attitude of the states'citizens who believe that the best response to a crime is a punishment in ‡icted for its own sake rather than to serve an extrinsic social purpose (such as deterrence or rehabilitation of the o¤ender), this moral attitude might be responsible for making judges become tougher on all (including less severe) crimes. Our results seem to refuse this critique. In particular, this e¤ect would give rise to a parallel shift of penalties in states with a death penalty law in place. However, marginal deterrence implies that a higher maximum punishment is associated with longer sentences not only in absolute but also in marginal terms, as we …nd in Section 5. 
Data and Preliminary Evidence

Data and Descriptive Statistics
We assemble a novel and unique data set by combining information from multiple sources. We draw individual-level data on a nationally-representative sample of 18,185 inmates of US prisons from the latest available wave of the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities. This survey was run by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2004 across inmates of State and Federal prisons. For each individual, the survey reports information on his/her current o¤ense, current sentence, criminal history, demographic characteristics, family background, and weapon, drugs and alcohol use. We focus on the sub-sample of 7,963 individuals who (i) are currently sentenced to serve time, (ii) have not received either a life or a death sentence (as in these cases we could not compute sentence length), and (iii) for whom we have complete information on all the variables used in the analysis.
The survey also contains information on the state in which each criminal committed his/her o¤ense and on the year of arrest. Using this information, we merge the individuallevel data with two state characteristics that are relevant to test the theoretical predictions of marginal deterrence. First, we use information on death penalty to construct proxies for the maximum punishment applied in each state and year. We obtain information on the existence of a death penalty law from the Death Penalty Information Center. As shown in Table 1 , the existence of a death penalty law varies markedly across states and time. Speci…cally, four states (Maine, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin) never had a death penalty law in place over our sample period , while in the remaining states, the number of years in which a death penalty law was in place ranges from 4 (Alaska and Hawaii) to 50 (Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma and Utah). 10 We complement the information on the existence of a death penalty law with data on the number of actual capital executions in each state and year, sourced from the Death Penalty Information Center. As shown in Table 1 To obtain an objective measure of the severity of each crime, we manually map the description of the crime committed by each inmate (as provided in the survey) to one of the o¤ense levels obtained from Chapter 2 of the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The latter sets rules for a uniform sentencing of individuals who are convicted to felonies and serious misdemeanors (punished with at least one year of prison) in the US Federal court system. Each crime is assigned to one of 43 di¤erent o¤ense levels, with higher numbers indicating more severe crimes. For instance, marijuana or hashish tra¢ cking has an o¤ense level of 13, attempted sexual assault of 17, unarmed robbery of 21, and …rst-degree murder of 43. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the individual characteristics. The inmates in our sample were arrested over a period of 50 years, from 1953 to 2003. Their average age is 36 and their sentence length equals 4,438 days (roughly 12 years) on average. The vast majority of inmates are males (79%) and US born (88%). The number of white and black inmates is roughly equivalent (49% and 42%, respectively), as is the number of married and divorced individuals (20% and 21%, respectively). The majority of inmates have a high-school diploma (68%), but we also observe a substantial share of individuals with either a university degree (17%) or just primary education (12%). One-quarter of inmates are held in Federal prisons and the remaining three-quarters in State prisons. One-…fth of inmates have a parent who was sentenced in the past, and roughly 15% of them have spent some time in jail before the current sentence. Almost one-fourth of individuals have used a weapon during the o¤ense. Finally, more than 50% of crimes have o¤ense levels between 12 and 22; the frequency of less and more serious crimes is lower.
Punishment-Severity Schedules
We now study how sentence length varies across o¤ense levels. According to Prediction 1, more severe crimes should be punished with longer sentences. Thus, in Figure 1a we plot the median sentence length across all inmates against the 43 o¤ense levels. We normalize all sentences by the sentence length of the …rst o¤ense level. The relation is sharply increasing, with the median sentence of the most severe crimes exceeding that of the least severe o¤enses by 20 times. In Figure 1b we repeat the exercise after controlling for observable characteristics of the inmates and the states. To this purpose, we start by regressing the log sentence length (number of days) on demographic, crime and state-level controls, plus a full set of year dummies. 11 Then, we compute the residuals from this regression, exponentiate them, and plot the median of the resulting variable against the 43 o¤ense levels. The main evidence is now even stronger. Next, we estimate state-speci…c punishment-severity schedules, in order to study whether the aggregate relationship documented in the previous graphs also holds across individual states. To this purpose we regress, separately for each state, log sentence length on o¤ense level (a variable ranging from 1 to 43 depending on the severity of the crime), plus demographic and crime controls and a time trend. We restrict to states with at least 40 inmates, so as to have enough degrees of freedom. The coe¢ cients on o¤ense level obtained from these regressions give the slopes of the state-speci…c schedules. These coe¢ cients indicate by how much sentence length changes (in percentage) in a given state for each additional level of o¤ense. The results are displayed in Figure 2 . Across all states, the average slope equals 0.021, indicating that sentence length increases by 2.1% on average for each additional level of o¤ense. The slopes range from -0.048 to 0.047. However, they are positive in all but two states, and 28 (75%) of the positive slopes are also statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. 12 Overall, these results indicate that the positive correlation between sentence length and o¤ense level is a robust relationship across US states. In Section 5 we will use the estimated state-speci…c slopes presented in this section to provide additional evidence on the e¤ectiveness of marginal deterrence.
Maximum Penalty and Monitoring Cost
Baseline Results
We now test Predictions 2 and 3. To this purpose, we estimate speci…cations of the following form:
where Days icst is the sentence length (in number of days) of inmate i, who committed crime of type c in state s and was arrested in year t; Controls icst is a vector of demographic, crime-and state-level controls (details below); c and t are o¤ense level and year …xed e¤ects, respectively; X st is our proxy for either maximum punishment or monitoring cost; and " icst is an error term. We correct the standard errors for clustering within state-year pairs and weight the regressions by the number of inmates in each state. This speci…cation allows us to compare sentence length across inmates who have committed crimes of similar severity (as captured by the …xed e¤ects c ) in a given year (as captured by t ) and who have similar observed characteristics (as captured by Controls icst ), but have acted in states characterized by di¤erent levels of maximum punishment and monitoring cost. We expect > 0 for maximum punishment and < 0 for monitoring cost, implying that sentences are ceteris paribus longer in states where the maximum punishment is higher (Prediction 2) or the cost of monitoring is lower (Prediction 3).
The baseline results are reported in Table 3 , where panel a) refers to maximum penalty and panel b) to monitoring cost. In columns (1) and (6), we only control for year and o¤ense level …xed e¤ects. In keeping with the comparative-statics predictions of Mookherjee and Png (1994), the results show a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on the death penalty dummy and a negative and precisely estimated coe¢ cient on the police wage.
In the remaining columns, we include further controls to account for di¤erences in observable characteristics across inmates and states. In columns (2) and (7), we control for demographics. These are: age and age squared; gender, race and marital status dummies; dummies for US born inmates and for inmates with sentenced parents; dummies for educational levels; and dummies for inmates who ever served in the US Armed Forces or are held in Federal prisons. In columns (3) and (8), we add controls for the criminal record of inmates: a dummy for use or possession of weapons during the o¤ense, a dummy for whether the inmate spent any time in other correctional facilities before arrest, and a dummy for whether the inmate ever used heroin. In columns (4) and (9), we add state-level covariates: the shares of Catholics, Protestants and Muslims in the state adult population, the state unemployment rate, GDP and population, and the number of violent crimes, robberies and property crimes per state inhabitant. Finally, in columns (5) and (10), we reach our preferred speci…cation by replacing the o¤ense level and year dummies with o¤ense level year …xed e¤ects ( ct ), which control for possible heterogeneous trends in sentence length across crime types. The main evidence is preserved across the board. Quantitatively, our estimates for the death penalty coe¢ cient range between 0.2 and 0.3, implying that in states with a death penalty law in place, sentences are 20-30% longer than in other states. Similarly, the estimated coe¢ cients on the police wage range between 0.3 and 0.6, implying that a 10% increase in police wages is associated with a 3-6% drop in sentence length. 13 
Robustness Checks
We now perform an extensive sensitivity analysis, which aims at showing that the baseline correlations are preserved when using alternative proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring cost, alternative estimation samples, and a battery of alternative strategies for dealing with possible remaining confounders.
Alternative Proxies
In Table 4 , we estimate our preferred speci…cations (columns 5 and 10 of Table 3 ) using alternative proxies for maximum penalty and monitoring cost. As for maximum punishment, our concern is that the dummy for the existence of a death penalty law may not fully account for the actual di¤erences in maximum punishment across states. The reason is that some of the states where death penalty is in place resort occasionally to the capital sentence. To address this concern, we switch from the simple existence of a death penalty law to a measure of its actual adoption. In particular, following a large empirical literature (e.g., Donohue and Wolfers, 2005; Katz, Levitt and Shustorivich, 2003) , we use the number of executions in each state and year. We include this variable either per 100,000 state inhabitants (column 1) or per 1,000 state prisoners (column 2). In both cases, we …nd that a more intensive use of the death penalty is associated with longer sentences. Quantitatively, an increase in per-capita or per-prisoner executions equal to the di¤erence between the 10th and the 90th percentile of the distribution (i.e., 0.11 and 0.2, respectively) implies an increase in sentence length by 6% or 9%, respectively.
Next, we construct an alternative proxy for monitoring cost, to address the concern that the variation in police wage across states may re ‡ect factors that simultaneously in ‡u-ence sentence length. Following Bove and Gavrilova (2017) and Masera (2016), we exploit a program created by the National Defense Authorization Act -i.e., the 1033 Program -which gave US police departments the possibility of obtaining military equipment and weapons from a number of disposition centers of the U.S. Government Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The cost of obtaining such material is increasing in the distance between the police department and the disposition center, because the department must cover all transportation costs. Accordingly, monitoring criminals should be ceteris paribus more costly for police departments that are located further away from the disposition centers. We start by geocoding all police departments in each US state and all DLA disposition centers (see Figure 3) . Then, we compute the distance between each department and its closest disposition center. Finally, we calculate the mean or median distance across all departments in each state. Compared to the police wage proxy, this variable is more likely to vary across states for factors unrelated with sentence length, but it does not exhibit time variation and may su¤er from some measurement error, since police departments may choose not to source equipment from the DLA disposition centers.
As shown in columns (3) and (5), the results imply that a 10% increase in distance is associated with a 1.4% decrease in sentence length. In columns (4) and (6), we further take advantage of the fact that the 1033 Program was signed into law in 1996, and thus became e¤ective only afterward. We therefore interact the distance variables with a dummy equal to 1 in 1996 and later years. As expected, the interaction term is negative and very precisely estimated, whereas the linear coe¢ cient -which captures the e¤ects of distance prior to 1996 -is close to zero.
Alternative Samples
In this section, we test the robustness of our baseline estimates across alternative samples. The results are reported in Table 5 . In column (1), we use the whole sample of inmates, including those with sentences shorter than one year, which were excluded from our baseline regressions because the duration of these sentences is typically noisy and the Federal guidelines only apply to felonies and serious misdemeanors. In column (2), we revert to the baseline sample and we further exclude the 1% of inmates with sentences exceeding 75 years. In column (3), we restrict the sample to inmates who committed crimes in their own state of residence (79% of inmates in our sample), since the information on the state may be reported with error for individuals who migrated to perform their illegal activities. The main evidence is largely una¤ected, suggesting that our results are not driven by in ‡uential observations or measurement issues.
In column (4), we restrict to inmates who are sentenced for a single crime, in order to measure sentence length uniformly across inmates, since in our data we observe sentence and o¤ense level for the most serious crime. In column (5), we account for recidivism by limiting the sample to individuals who have never been in jail before. In column (6), we exclude inmates who have committed crimes of the highest level of o¤ense (43) .
This accounts for the possibility that, in states without a death penalty, we may observe inmates who would have been sentenced to death if their crime was committed in a state where the death penalty is instead in place; in this case, these inmates would not appear in our data set. The results are unchanged.
14 Finally, columns (7) and (8) show that our results hold strong in the sub-sample of inmates of State prisons, but are not present in the sub-sample of inmates of Federal prisons. Interestingly, this is consistent with the fact that, in the case of Federal o¤enses, sentences are largely uniform across states, since they are set by the Federal guidelines. Therefore, for Federal o¤enses, there is little useful variation across states to achieve identi…cation.
Confounding Factors
So far, our results support the main predictions of the Mookherjee and Png (1994) model. One may be concerned, however, that our correlations are coincidental, resulting from unobserved factors that are simultaneously correlated with sentence length, maximum punishment and monitoring cost. We believe that our empirical approach should largely allay this concern, for a number of reasons. First, our speci…cations control for a wealth of observable characteristics, both at the state and at the inmate level, as well as for heterogeneous trends across crime types. These controls absorb a large number of factors that may confound the results. Second, we obtained similar results when using alternative proxies, which exploit di¤erent sources of variation in maximum punishment and monitoring cost, as well as a number of alternative samples, which give emphasis to di¤erent sources of variation in the data. We view as unlikely that a third factor could make both correlations consistent with theory, across all these proxies, samples and speci…cations. Third, in the next sections we will provide additional results on marginal deterrence and its e¤ectiveness. This large and varied body of evidence always points to marginal deterrence being the underlying principle of US enforcement policies. Nevertheless, we will now discuss a number of possible remaining confounders and show that our correlations are robust to accounting for them.
Underlying trends We start by showing that our estimates are not spuriously driven by heterogeneous trends across states. To this purpose, in Table 6 we augment our speci…cations with interactions between the year dummies and the initial value of the 14 In untabulated regressions, we found similar results when excluding: Alaska and Hawaii, the two states in which the death penalty was in place for the smallest number of years; Texas and Virginia, which are the two toughest states against crime, since they have the highest number of cumulated executions over the sample period; Maine and North Dakota, the two states with the smallest number of inmates; and Texas and Florida, the two states with the largest number of prisoners. state characteristic named in each column's heading: unemployment rate (column 1), population size (column 2), the share of Catholics in the population (column 3) and the violent crime rate (column 4). The basic idea is that states with di¤erent initial characteristics may have experienced a di¤erent evolution (e.g., in terms of enforcement policies or attitudes towards crime) over time. These interaction terms absorb such crossstate di¤erences in trends. The results are close to our baseline estimates.
Unobserved heterogeneity Until now, our approach consisted of comparing sentence length across states, for crimes of similar severity and for inmates with similar observable characteristics. Despite the large set of controls included in our speci…cations, one may still worry that our results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity across states. For instance, more conservative states may favor the death penalty and be harsher on crime more in general. To address this concern, in columns (1) and (3) of Table 7 we re-estimate the baseline speci…cation including state …xed e¤ects, which absorb time-invariant di¤erences across states. We also control for a full set of US Census division year …xed e¤ects, which absorb time-varying di¤erences across states located in di¤erent areas. 15 The coe¢ cients are now identi…ed using time variation in sentences, death penalty and police wage within states, after controlling for common shocks to states belonging to the same region. If anything, the results are now even stronger. 16 Unobserved shocks Finally, one may worry that our estimates are spuriously driven by unobserved shocks moving maximum punishment and monitoring cost simultaneously with sentence length. In columns (2) and (4) of 16 These speci…cations cannot be estimated with the distance-based proxy for monitoring cost since this variable is constant over time. di¤erences in political preferences over the medium run (four years), and thus gets rid of variation due to temporary shocks. We instead instrument police wage using the average wage paid in the private non-farm sector of the state. The private sector wage acts as an alternative wage for prospective policemen. It therefore helps isolating variation in police wage due to structural transformations driving changes in policemen supply. Both instruments have strong predictive power in the …rst stage, and the second-stage coe¢ cients remain reassuringly similar to our baseline OLS estimates.
Additional Evidence
In this section we corroborate our previous results by providing evidence on a number of additional predictions of the marginal deterrence framework.
Heterogeneity across O¤ense Levels
Marginal deterrence implies that a higher maximum punishment or a lower monitoring cost are associated with higher penalties not only in absolute but also in marginal terms. To provide evidence on these predictions, we modify our baseline speci…cation as follows:
where Of f Lev c is a variable ranging from 1 to 43 across o¤ense levels. 17 If 2 > 0 when X st is maximum punishment, then a higher maximal penalty is associated with higher sentences also in marginal terms, as in this case the overall coe¢ cient on X st ( 1 + 2 Of f Lev c ) is larger for more severe crimes. A similar argument holds when X st is monitoring cost if 2 < 0. The results are reported in Table 8 . The interaction coe¢ cients are correctly signed and highly statistically signi…cant. Using the point estimates, Figure 4 plots the coe¢ cient on death penalty and monitoring cost against the o¤ense level (solid red line) together with the corresponding 95% con…dence intervals (dashed black lines). The coe¢ cient on either variable grows sharply with the level of severity of the crime. For death penalty, the coe¢ cient ranges from virtually zero for o¤ense levels below 17 to 0:525 (s.e. 0:105) for o¤ense level 43. Similarly, in the case of monitoring cost the coe¢ cient is small and statistically not signi…cant for o¤ense levels below 18 and reaches 0:791 (s.e. 0:214) for o¤ense level 43.
Inequality
The marginal deterrence framework of Mookherjee and Png (1994) converges to the singleact model if criminals are all equal. Accordingly, we conjecture that the coe¢ cient on maximum punishment and monitoring cost should be larger for states where the private bene…ts from crime are more heterogeneous. To test this conjecture, we augment our baseline speci…cation as follows:
where Inequal st is a measure of income inequality, which we use as a proxy for heterogeneity in the private bene…ts from crime in di¤erent states. We expect 3 > 0 when X st is maximum punishment and 3 < 0 when X st is monitoring cost.
The results are reported in Table 9 , where each column refers to a di¤erent inequality index: the Gini coe¢ cient (columns 1 and 5), the real mean deviation (columns 2 and 6), the Theil index (columns 3 and 7) and the top 10% income share (columns 4 and 8). We source these indexes from Frank (2009) and Frank et al. (2015) . In all cases, we …nd the interaction coe¢ cients to be statistically signi…cant and correctly signed. Consistent with our conjecture, this suggests that within-state inequality is an important mediator of the e¤ects of maximum penalty and monitoring cost on sentence length. 18 
Monitoring Rate
Our individual-level data are well suited for studying the relationship between maximum punishment or monitoring cost and sentence length. Testing the same comparative statics on the level of monitoring chosen by the regulator requires the use of aggregate data at the state level, which raises more concerns with identi…cation. Nevertheless, we now provide suggestive evidence on two additional comparative-statics results in Mookherjee and Png (1994) : (1) if the maximum possible punishment is higher, the regulator should, other things being equal, increase the monitoring rate; and (2) if the cost of monitoring is lower, the regulator should, other things being equal, increase the monitoring rate.
To proxy for the monitoring rate, we use the employment share of policemen in each state and year. We obtain information on full-time police employment over 1982-2003 18 We have also computed the overall coe¢ cients on maximum punishment and monitoring cost The results are reported in Table 10 . Panel a) refers to maximum punishment. In particular, in column (1) we regress our proxy for monitoring rate on a dummy equal to one for states and years with a death penalty law in place, controlling for state covariates and year dummies. In columns (2) and (3), we instead use the number of executions -expressed in per-capita or per-prisoner terms, respectively -in place of the death penalty dummy. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, we …nd positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients, suggesting that the monitoring rate is higher in states where maximum punishment is also higher. Panel b) contains the results for monitoring cost. In column (4), we regress our proxy for monitoring rate on police wage. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, we …nd a negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient, suggesting that the monitoring rate is higher in states where monitoring is less costly. In columns (5)- (10), we instead use the distance-based proxies for monitoring cost. These variables enter with a negative coe¢ cient (columns 5 and 8), and the correlations stem from the years following the approval of the 1033 Program (i.e., since 1996 onwards), irrespective of whether we control (columns 7 and 10) or not (columns 6 and 9) for state …xed e¤ects to condition on time-invariant state characteristics.
E¤ectiveness of Marginal Deterrence
The evidence presented above provides support for some of the comparative statics of the marginal deterrence framework of Mookherjee and Png (1994) . In this section, we present evidence on the e¤ectiveness of marginal deterrence. To this purpose, we use the slopes of the state-speci…c punishment-severity schedules estimated in Section 3 to divide US states into groups characterized by schedules of di¤erent steepness. States with steeper schedules are those in which, other things being equal, marginal deterrence is more likely to be at work, given that in this framework steep sanctions are needed to obtain deterrence. Accordingly, we expect the predictions of the marginal deterrence framework to hold stronger in states featuring relatively steeper punishment-severity schedules. In panels a) and b) of Table 11 , we therefore re-estimate our baseline speci…cations separately on di¤erent groups states. In the …rst two columns, we divide states in two groups with schedule slope below and above the sample median, respectively. As expected, both the death penalty dummy and the police wage enter with larger coe¢ cients in the sub-sample of states with steeper schedules. In the remaining three columns, we instead classify states in three groups, with schedule slope in the bottom, top or intermediate quartiles of the distribution. Strikingly, the coe¢ cients on maximum punishment and monitoring cost grow monotonically in size, and become statistically more signi…cant, as we move from states with relatively ‡atter schedules to states with relatively steeper sanctions. These results suggests that the comparative statics of Mookherjee and Png (1994) hold stronger in states that behave more in keeping with the marginal deterrence framework.
The reason why marginal deterrence requires penalties to be graduated is to avoid criminals switching to more severe acts, which would follow if the enforcement was leveled upward. Then, if marginal deterrence does work, we would expect steeper sanctions to be associated with less severe crimes. We now provide evidence on this using two complementary approaches. First, in panel c) of Table 11 , we regress the log mean o¤ense level in a state on the slope coe¢ cient for that state, separately for states with schedule slope below and above the median. To ease the interpretation of the results, we standardize the slope coe¢ cients to have mean zero and standard deviation one. The results show that, in states with steeper schedules, an increase in the slope coe¢ cient is associated with a signi…cant reduction in the average o¤ense level. The estimated coe¢ cient implies that a one standard deviation increase in the slope of the punishmentseverity schedule is associated with a 8.6% decrease in o¤ense level on average. On the contrary, there is no signi…cant relationship between o¤ense levels and schedule steepness in the remaining states.
Second, in panel d) we study how the number of inmates who have committed crimes of di¤erent severity changes as the punishment-severity schedule becomes steeper. To this purpose, we compute the number of inmates in each state-o¤ense level cell, and regress this variable on state …xed e¤ects, o¤ense level …xed e¤ects, and the interaction between the o¤ense level variable and the slope coe¢ cient. The results show that the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative and precisely estimated in the sub-sample of states with steeper schedules. The point estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in the schedule slope is associated with a 0:13 additional reduction in the number of inmates for each additional level of o¤ense. Hence, steeper schedules are associated with relatively fewer inmates committing more serious crimes. No signi…cant relationship holds instead for the remaining states.
Finally note that, as a corollary, our results also contribute to the important debate on the deterrent e¤ect of capital punishment. Previous studies have focused on the e¤ect of death penalty on …rst-degree murder (see, e.g., the references in footnote 4). Our combined evidence that death penalty makes the punishment-severity schedule steeper (Figure 4) and that a steeper schedule induces individuals to switch to less severe crimes (panels c) and d) of Table 11 ) suggests that capital punishment is e¤ective also at preventing crimes which are not directly targeted by the death penalty.
Concluding Remarks
The simple takeaway of the theoretical debate on marginal deterrence is that penalties should be graduated to the severity of the crime. Surprisingly, so far there has been no attempt to test this insight -i.e., whether actual penalties re ‡ect or not marginal deterrence. The main contribution of this paper is to test the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement and its main predictions.
To this purpose, we have assembled a novel and unique data set, which combines individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US inmates with proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring costs across US states over 50 years, as well as with an objective measure of crime o¤ense levels. First, we have documented that actual penalties are increasing in the level of the o¤ense. Second, we have shown that penalties are increasing in maximum punishment and decreasing in monitoring cost, consistent with the comparative-statics predictions of Mookherjee and Png (1994) . Finally, we have provided evidence that steeper sanctions are associated with less severe crimes, consistent with marginal deterrence being e¤ective. Testing these relationships allowed us to provide the …rst assessment of the empirical validity of the marginal deterrence principle as opposed to other competing theories of justice.
Although deterrence is based on a rational conception of human behavior in which individuals freely choose between alternative courses of action to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, behavioral aspects might well play a complementary role. For instance, Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2016) , exploiting the di¤erential timing in the abolition of capital punishment across o¤enses, are able to retrieve the e¤ect of changes in punishment severity on jury verdicts. This provides empirical evidence that capital punishment may impact on the ability of a jury to be impartial. However, by showing that marginal deterrence is at work, our evidence suggests that the rational economic model of law enforcement accounts well for the actual enforcement policies chosen by regulators. (3) and (4) use the log average of this measure across all police departments in each state; columns (5) and (6) use the log median distance. Post 1996 is a dummy equal to one in 1996 and all subsequent years. All regressions include demographic controls, criminal record controls, state controls and offense level x year dummies, as in columns (5) and (10) of Table 3 . ***, **, *: indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. See also notes to previous tables. (4), (7) and (10) also include state fixed effects. ***, **, *: indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. See also notes to previous tables. The figure plots the median sentence length across all inmates on the base offense level assigned to their crime. Figure 1a) reports the unconditional relation whereas Figure 1b ) plots the schedule conditional on individual and state characteristics. (1) and (2) 
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